The behavioral predictions of (idealized, non-probabilistic) reasoning types for the simple and complex conditions in Fig. 1 of the main text are plotted schematically in Fig. 8 . There are two strands of reasoning types, one starting with a literal interpreter (R 0 , the upper rows), and one starting with a literal speaker (S 0 , the lower rows). Each of the four diagrams should be read from left to right. Interpretation behavior is a function from utterances (denoting properties) to referents; production behavior is a function from referents to utterances (denoting properties). These functions are represented here by left-to-right arrows.
· In simple production trials, the designated referent is the green monster with the red hat. It is indicated by an asterisk in Fig. 1a . The speaker's choice options are the four pictorial messages on the right in Fig. 1a . Only the target message ("green monster") and the competitor ("red hat") are true; the other two messages we call distractors. The former would be selected with equal likelihood by a hypothetical literal sender S 0 . However, a Gricean speaker S 1 would choose the target message "green monster", because that would be an unambiguous description, unlike the competitor "red hat." This is what an S 1 speaker would do, according to the idealized ibr types. So, both S 1 and S 2 can solve the simple condition.
· In simple comprehension trials, the listener is to interpret the description "red hat," as indicated by an asterisk in Fig. 1a . There are two interpretations for which that messages is true: the target interpretation (robot) and the competitor interpretation (green monster). The literal interpreter R 0 would choose either with equal likelihood, but exclude the distractor interpretation (purple monster). But an exhaustive interpreter R 1 , who reasons about what an unbiased literal speaker would say, can conclude that it is twice as likely that the speaker refers to the target (robot) than that she refers to the competitor (green monster). This because there is only one true description for the robot, whereas there are two for the green monster. Consequently, both R 1 and R 2 can solve the simple condition.
· In complex production trials, the designated referent is the green monster with the red hat, indicated by an asterisk in the Fig. 1b . Now, both the target message "red hat" and the competitor message "green monster" are two-way ambiguous under their obvious semantic interpretation. Consequently, even a Gricean speaker S 1 would be indifferent between them, since they are equally informative under a literal interpretation. But hyperpragmatic S 2 speakers assume that an R 1 listener would only interpret the target message "green monster" as possibly referring to the designated referent. This is because the competitor message "red hat" is the only description usable for the robot. So, by taking R 1 's pragmatically strengthened interpretations into account, S 2 would pick the target message "green monster." In sum, only S 2 solves the complex condition.
· In complex comprehension trials, the listener is to interpret the message " green monster." This is semantically ambiguous in the context between the target referent (green monster with a red hat) and the competitor (green monster with the blue hat). It is therefore equally likely to be sent by a literal speaker. So, both R 0 and R 1 would choose the target and the competitor referent with equal probability. But a Gricean interpreter R 2 would assume that a Gricean speaker S 1 would describe the green monster with the blue hat with the unambiguous description "blue hat." Hence, R 2 would pick the target referent in this case.
